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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
I describe the complex support systems around the world, focusing on their 
importance for economic growth and fiscal sustainability. Familial transfers for old 
age support are somewhat significant in some Asian economies including Korea, 
although they deteriorate quite rapidly. Public transfer systems are less significant in 
Korea compared with most OECD member countries. This is important because 
Korea has had the opportunity to develop sustainable systems less encumbered by 
obligations made to current and future generations. Relying on accumulated assets 
rather than transfers helped countries create capital-intensive economies that can 
maintain standards of living. This is true for Korea, but the question of how the labor 
and capital market will respond to the rapidly changing social welfare system 
remains as a critical question.  
 
 
 
 
본 논문의 목적은 생애별 지원체계를 국가별로 비교하고, 거기서 경제성장과 정부재정의 
지속성에 대한 함의를 도출해 내는 데 있다. 가족지원체계는 점차 그 중요성이 줄어듦에도 
불구, 한국을 비롯한 몇몇 아시아 국가에서 유의하게 나타났다. 공공지원체계(사회보장)의 경우 
한국은 OECD 국가 내에서 매우 낮은 수준을 보였는데, 이러한 낮은 사회보장이 높은 저축률과 
자본축적에 기여한 긍정적인 측면은 인정된다. 하지만 지난 10년 동안 한국에서의 사회보장은 
매우 빠른 속도로 변화하였다. 한국의 자본시장과 노동시장이 이러한 변화에 어떻게 반응하는 
가가 향후 정부의 정책방향을 결정하는 데 중요한 요인이 될 것이다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
In most societies children and elderly consume much more than they produce 
through labor. The pattern of the lifecycle deficit varies a lot across countries 
because countries vary greatly in per capita economic lifecycles as well as 
population age structure. Hence the gaps between consumption and labor income, 
lifecycle deficit, should be filled by reallocations from working adults. Both public 
and private sectors mediate the resource reallocation. The public sector reallocates 
resources relying on social mandates and implemented by governments. Education, 
public pensions, and healthcare programs are important examples of public 
reallocations. Private sector reallocations are usually governed by voluntary 
contracts and behavior patterns that are mediated mostly by families. The 
reallocation system also varies greatly across countries. An understanding of the 
pattern of economic lifecycle and reallocations is of great interest to both academics 
and policy makers in large part due to a huge policy challenge; countries need to 
develop social systems and institutions that can provide economic security to their 
citizens and sustain strong economic growth. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the current state of support system 
around the world, with a special reference to public support for the children and 
elderly. Protecting the children and elderly is a high and growing priority for all 
countries since their limited participation in the labor market makes them 
particularly vulnerable to poverty, lack of access to health care, and other risks. In 
particular, I highlight the results for Korea with respect to the results for other 
countries. From the results, I emphasize the difference of reallocation systems for 
economic growth, fiscal sustainability, and other policy issues.  
This study will utilize the data set of national transfer accounts (NTA). The 
accounts system measure how people at each age in the lifecycle acquire and use 
economic resources.1 The NTA represent a significant advance compared with 
previous studies because they provide a comprehensive set of measures of 
production, consumption, savings, and transfers in a manner consistent with national 
income and product accounts.2 The NTA also consider the public and private 
                                                                                                                                                      
1  NTA were developed as an international project led by Ronald Lee of the University of California 
at Berkeley and Andrew Mason of the East-West Center. 
2  NTA are estimated relying on a variety of data sources. In addition to national income and product 
accounts, government financial statistics and government administrative records are used to 
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sectors, both of which mediate economic flows across ages, which in turn can be 
used to study the implications of demographic change. I use the data from 32 
countries, which range from very poor countries to most advanced countries. More 
detailed information on the NTA and methodology for calculating NTA is available 
from Mason, Lee et al. (2009); from Lee, Lee, and Mason (2008); or on the project 
website, www.ntaccounts.org.  
 
 
Ⅱ. Consumption 
 
 
Consumption in NTA is a broad measure that includes the value of all goods and 
services consumed by individuals and by governments on their behalf. This measure 
is generally consistent with the notion that consumption is a critical measure of 
economic wellbeing. Consumption varies by age due to individual need, behaviors, 
institutions, and market forces. It also depends on many other historical, cultural, 
political, social, and economic factors. For the purpose of this paper, it is important 
to examine how children and elderly differ across countries in terms of their 
consumption. In particular, it is important how both families and government 
support the education, healthcare, and other consumption needs of children and the 
elderly.  
The NTA project builds on these estimates by providing comprehensive 
estimates of consumption by one year age groups. NTA disaggregates consumption 
into three components—education, healthcare, and other consumption—and 
distinguishes two forms of consumption: private consumption, the goods and 
services purchased by individuals and families; and public consumption, goods and 
services provided directly by the government. Public expenditures on education and 
healthcare are allocated by age, primarily from administrative records. Education 
consumption is based on budget data to construct estimates of spending per student 
at each level of schooling. These estimates are combined with school enrollment 
records to estimate public education consumption for one-year age groups. The 
sources of information used to allocate public spending on healthcare are more 
varied and more subject to error. In some economies, government agencies or 
provider surveys give detailed estimates of public spending on healthcare by age. In 
                                                                                                                                                      
estimate economy-wide aggregates. Age profiles are estimated by making extensive use of 
administrative records and nationally representative income and expenditure surveys, labor force 
surveys, health expenditure surveys, and special-purpose household surveys. 
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other economies, the number of patients at each age is combined with records of 
costs per patient. Estimates of private consumption are constructed from income and 
expenditure surveys, health expenditure surveys, and special-purpose household 
surveys. Private consumption of education and healthcare by households is allocated 
to household members of different ages based on regression analysis of survey data.3  
[Figure 1] illustrates the component of consumption for two countries, Korea and 
the Sweden by age. In both countries, per capita consumption increases steadily until 
it reaches peak between ages 17 and 18. The consumption decreases thereafter until 
age 40. However, the major difference between two countries starts around age 60. 
In Korea, the consumption start to decline around age 60 while in Sweden it 
increases very rapidly until the end of lifecycle. Another major difference between 
Korea and Sweden is whether the resource is provided by family or government. For 
example, the education is mainly provided by Swedish government, while in Korea, 
a great deal of the cost of education is borne by families. In particular, the Swedish 
government provides considerable support for daycare and hence the consumption 
increases at very early ages. This is true for healthcare consumption. In Sweden, the 
rapid increase in healthcare consumption for the old is entirely due to the provision 
of publicly provided healthcare. The steep rise in consumption among the oldest age 
groups in Sweden is also evident in the US, Japan, and other developed countries, 
while Korea does not show this pattern.  
<Table 1> summarizes the measure of consumption by component for children 
and elderly. To compare across countries, consumption at each age is normalized by 
the consumption of working-age population aged 20 to 64. In almost all 32 NTA 
member countries children ages 0~19 consume less than working age adults and the 
elderly ages. However, there is considerable variation in children’s consumption 
levels, especially compared with that of the elderly. [Figure 2] presents the average 
values for consumption by children and the elderly in all 32 economies, divided into 
four quadrants. In developing economies, per capita consumption is low for children, 
which might be due to their high fertility. This contrast between the four African 
economies and the four East Asian economies is especially striking, where data 
points for the four African economies lie well to the left of the overall average,  
                                                                                                                                                      
3  Other public consumption—such as defense, infrastructure, and the operating costs of government— 
is divided evenly among all individuals. Other private consumption—the largest category—
includes food, clothing, housing, transportation, recreation, and consumer durables. This is 
allocated among household members using a scale that ranges from 0.4 for children under age five 
to 1.0 for adults age 20 and above. Again, for more detailed information on the methodology for 
calculating per capita consumption is available from Mason, Lee et al. (2009); from Lee, Lee, and 
Mason (2008); or on the project website, www.ntaccounts.org.  
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[Figure 1] Age Consumption Profiles by 
 
Source: National Transfer Accounts Database.
 
Component (Korea, 2000 and Sweden, 2003)
 
 
 
 
 <Table 1> Per Capita Consumption by Children and the Elderly 
 
Per Capita Consumption by Children and the 
Elderly (% per capita consumption of 20~64) 
  
Per Capita Human-Capital 
Spending (% average 
annual labor income of age 
30~49 
Importance of Per Capita 
Healthcare Consumption 
Age 65+ (% all per capita 
consumption age 65+) 
 Private Public Combined Percent public Private Public Combined Private Public Combined 
 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
      
Africa 49 98 124 99 59 98 71 50 86 86 171 8 3 10 
Kenya, 1994 (KE) 50 101 140 95 60 100 74 49 17 60 78 1 2 3 
Nigeria, 2004 (NG) 52 111 95 95 55 110 65 46 191 21 212 15 1 15 
Senegal, 2005 (SN) 54 89 120 97 61 90 69 52 46 65 111 5 2 6 
South Africa, 2005 (ZA) 40 90 140 110 59 94 78 55 89 196 285 10 7 17 
East Asia 68 94 168 152 88 105 71 61 210 240 450 8 14 22 
China, 2002 (CN) 64 94 148 136 84 104 70 59 166 156 322 15 13 28 
Japan, 2004 (JP) 58 109 219 227 88 131 79 68 140 389 529 5 23 27 
South Korea, 2000 (KR) 71 85 160 121 87 91 69 59 225 202 427 8 9 16 
Taiwan, 1998 (TW) 80 87 143 126 94 96 64 59 307 213 520 6 11 17 
South & Southeast Asia 59 94 171 114 70 96 74 55 108 132 240 9 3 12 
India, 2004 (IN) 54 109 135 141 63 113 72 56 68 107 175 11 8 18 
Indonesia, 2005 (ID) 62 82 214 120 73 85 78 59 84 137 221 3 3 5 
Philippines, 1999 (PH) 58 104 155 107 69 104 73 51 124 111 235 6 2 8 
Thailand, 2004 (TH) 56 97 206 105 76 98 79 52 80 251 331 18 4 22 
Vietnam, 2008 (VN) 65 80 144 99 71 82 69 55 186 52 239 6 1 7 
Latin America & Caribbean 54 101 161 124 70 104 75 55 123 215 338 8 8 16 
Argentina, 1997 (AR) 56 96 153 125 78 103 73 57 98 229 327 6 13 19 
Brazil, 2002 (BR) 47 105 128 110 65 106 73 51 82 218 300 9 8 17 
Chile, 1997 (CH) 55 99 184 139 70 103 77 58 99 193 292 8 7 15 
 <Table 1> Continued 
 
Per Capita Consumption by Children and the 
Elderly (% per capita consumption of 20~64) 
  
Per Capita Human-Capital 
Spending (% average 
annual labor income of age 
30~49 
Importance of Per Capita 
Healthcare Consumption 
Age 65+ (% all per capita 
consumption age 65+) 
 Private Public Combined Percent public Private Public Combined Private Public Combined 
 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
Age 
0~19 
Age 
65+ 
      
Colombia, 2008 (CO) 50 106 171 144 69 112 77 58 139 248 388 7 10 17 
Costa Rica, 2004 (CR) 50 99 136 144 63 105 73 59 72 252 324 4 15 19 
Jamaica, 2002 (JM) 57 95 166 130 70 99 74 58 180 169 349 6 7 12 
Mexico, 2004 (MX) 54 90 164 118 65 93 75 57 100 232 333 2 7 9 
Peru, 2007 (PE) 54 112 175 92 68 109 76 45 139 194 334 8 2 11 
Uruguay, 2006 (UY) 63 104 176 114 79 105 74 52 201 196 397 19 6 25 
Europe, Australia, & the  
United States 
53 93 178 187 82 115 77 66 51 350 401 5 24 29 
Australia, 2004 (AU) 56 87 165 173 74 102 75 66 108 247 355 7 18 25 
Austria, 2005 (AT) 52 90 193 158 83 105 79 64 23 360 384 4 18 22 
Finland, 2004 (FI) 51 91 155 153 80 108 75 63 17 344 361 4 17 21 
Germany, 2003 (DE) 52 105 149 168 73 119 74 61 37 290 327 5 18 23 
Hungary, 2005 (HU) 46 97 149 139 77 109 76 59 33 361 394 7 19 26 
Slovenia, 2004 (SI) 64 90 252 206 106 116 80 70 45 460 505 5 30 35 
Spain, 2000 (ES) 60 89 181 158 84 102 75 64 61 333 395 3 20 23 
Sweden, 2003 (SW) 49 84 219 280 97 139 82 77 17 525 542 2 47 49 
United Kingdom, 2007 UK) 55 86 142 209 74 113 72 71 63 295 359 1 30 31 
United States, 2003 (US) 49 112 174 227 71 133 78 67 100 287 387 12 21 33 
Grand Mean 56 96 164 143 75 106 74 59 104 231 336 7 12 19 
Source: NTA Bulletin #4 (forthcoming). Originally calculated using the National Transfer Accounts database. 
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[Figure 2] Per Capita Consumption for Children (ages 0~19) vs. for the Elderly  
(ages 65 and older) 
 
Note: Measured as % of per capita consumption of aged 20 to 64. 
* Africa: Kenya 1994 (KE), Nigeria 2004 (NG), Senegal 2005 (SN), South Africa 2005 (ZA) 
East Asia: China 2002 (CN), Japan 2004 (JP), South Korea 2000 (KR), Taiwan 1998 (TW) 
South & Southeast Asia: India 2004 (IN), Indonesia 2005 (ID), Philippines 1999 (PH), Thailand 2004 (TH), Vietnam 
2008 (VN) 
Latin America & Caribbean: Argentina 1997 (AR), Brazil 2002 (BR), Chile 1997 (CH), Colombia 2008 (CO), Costa Rica 
2004 (CR), Jamaica, 2002 (JM), Mexico 2004 (MX), Peru 2007 (PE), Uruguay 2006 (UY) 
Europe, Australia, & the United States: Australia 2004 (AU), Austria 2005 (AT), Finland 2004 (FI), Germany 2003 (DE), 
Hungary 2005 (HU), Slovenia, 2004 (SI), Spain 2000 (ES), Sweden 2003 (SW), United Kingdom 2007 (UK), United 
States 2003 (US) 
Source: National Transfer Accounts Database. 
 
while data points for the four East Asian economies lie well to the right. A child in 
Africa consumes about 60 percent of consumption by a prime-age adult, while a 
child in East Asia consumes 88 percent of a prime-age adult’s consumption on 
average. Since this consumption includes consumption for human capital, such as 
education and health, the low consumption by children may also inhibit their 
development into fully productive members of these countries. Per capita 
consumption for people aged 65 and older is higher than per capita consumption for 
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working-age adult. It is particularly high in Japan, Sweden, and the US. It is 
particularly low in South Asia and Latin America.  
The role of the government vs. family varies substantially too. [Figure 3] present 
the per capita consumption for children and elderly by public vs. private provision, 
again divided into four quadrants. Korea and Taiwan stand out with particularly high 
private consumption by children because of high education spending. By contrast, 
children’s public consumption is particularly high in Slovenia, Japan, Indonesia, 
Sweden, and Thailand. Thus, it does not appear to be the level of development 
which leads to higher level of public consumption for children, while all East-Asian 
countries have higher private consumption for children, again due to high education 
spending. Private consumption for children tends to be low for children in many 
European countries, but these are balanced by their high public consumption. Per 
capita consumption for elderly tends to be higher than that by working-age adults. 
Public consumption for elderly is high in all European countries and US while it is 
low in Africa, Asia, and Latin American countries. On the other hand, private 
consumption is particularly low in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Korea. Again, the level 
of private consumption for elderly is low in many European countries compared 
with the working population, but these are balanced by their high public 
consumption. 
[Figure 4] shows the share of public consumption for children and the elderly. In 
all European countries and in the US and Japan, their governments provides more 
than 60 percent of the consumption for elderly. It is particularly high in Sweden 
where the government provides over 75 of the consumption of the elderly. 
Governments of Korea, China, and Taiwan provide about 60 percent of consumption 
for the elderly. In almost every African and Latin American countries, the public 
sector provides a much smaller proportion of elderly consumption. For children the 
picture is a little bit more mixed. In most European countries and in the US and 
Japan, government consumption is still the dominant form of consumption for 
children, accounting over 73 percent of the children’s consumption. However, in 
Asia, public consumption accounts for over 77 percent of children’s consumption 
for Thailand and Indonesia, while it is lower than 70 percent in Korea, Taiwan, and 
China. It might be that the private education consumption is too high in these three 
economies. This is also closely related with the low fertility in the region.  As 
fertility comes down and the number of children diminishes, families and 
governments have an opportunity to invest more in each child, trying to enhancing 
the productivity of future workers.  
Needless to say, these cross country results should be interpreted with caution in 
part because the public consumption includes other public consumption such as  
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[Figure 3] Per Capita Private Consumption vs. Public Consumption for Children and the 
Elderly 
A. Children Aged 0~19 
  
B. Elderly Aged 65 and Older 
 
Note: The units of y-axis are % of per capita public consumption of aged 20 to 64, and the units of x-axis are % of per capita 
private consumption of aged 20 to 64. 
Source: National Transfer Accounts Database. 
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[Figure 4] Per Capita Share of Public Consumption for Children and the Elderly 
 
Note: Measured as % of per capita public consumption out of per capita total consumption for each age group. 
Source: National Transfer Accounts Database. 
 
defense, which also varies a lot across countries. Since the NTA allocates the other 
consumption evenly amongst population, it may bias the true measure of individual 
wellbeing. But it should be also noted that the other consumption is actually a very 
small share of consumption especially for developed economies. [Figure 5] presents 
the private vs. public health consumption for the elderly which is measured as the 
percentage of per capita consumption for people aged 65 and older. The figure 
shows the enormous public healthcare consumption for the elderly in many 
European countries as well as in Japan and the US, largely due to their long-term 
healthcare. Sweden is an extreme case where the publicly provided healthcare 
consumption accounts for almost 50 percent of all consumption for people aged 65 
and older. In general, the elderly tend to consume much more for publicly provided 
healthcare in high-income economies. However, there is wide variation too. For 
example, Korea and Brazil are close to India in terms of its importance of publicly 
provided healthcare spending for the elderly, but importance of private health 
consumption for Korea and Brazil are much less than India.4 The same variation  
                                                                                                                                                      
4  The year is 2000 for Korea and 1998 for Taiwan. The healthcare spending has increased very 
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[Figure 5] Importance of per Capita Healthcare Consumption for Ages 65 and Older  
 
Note: Measured as % of per capita consumption of aged 65 and older. 
Source: National Transfer Accounts Database.  
 
could be found amongst countries in the same region. An elderly Nigerian consumes 
much more healthcare than an elderly Kenyan, provided more by the private sector.  
Children and the elderly consume more than they produce, so economic 
mechanisms are required to shift resources from the surplus working ages to the 
deficit ages. The economic system that fulfills this critical need is called the age 
reallocation system.  Countries differ considerably in the ways that they deal with 
age reallocations with important implications on their economies. The next section 
describes this in detail. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
rapidly for both economies, and hence the picture will be somewhat different now. This issue is 
addressed in the next session. 
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Ⅲ. Economic Resources to Fund Consumption 
 
 
There are three ways to fund the consumption needs. First the consumption needs 
can be met through their own labor income. Second, the consumption needs can be 
met through transfers, which involve no explicit quid pro quo. Resources flow from 
one party to another either voluntarily in the case of most private transfers or 
involuntarily in the case of public transfers. Third, the consumption needs can be 
met through asset-based reallocation which rely on inter-temporal exchanges. 
Individuals can accumulate personal savings during their working years and rely on 
income from it or dispose those assets or savings during retirement. Likewise, if 
individuals can borrow to finance their consumption needs, they are relying on asset-
based reallocations to consume more than their current labor income. Governments 
play an important role by taxing working-age adults and providing benefits to the 
young and the old. Families perform a similar role by using their resources to 
support children and often the elderly too.   
The main features of the age reallocation system are illustrated in [Figure 6] 
which reports per capita net economic flows by age in Korea in 2000. Flows to both 
children and the elderly are shown to emphasize that transfers go in both 
directions—upward to the elderly and downward to the young. Children depend 
mostly on a combination of public and private transfers. The support system for 
older adults varies considerably with age in Korea as it does in most countries.  
Those 60 and older rely primarily on assets while private transfers are more 
important for the very old. Public transfers increase until early 70s but decreases 
thereafter. Both private and public transfers are negative for prime age adults 
suggesting that they provide more to children and the elderly by paying tax or 
through familial transfers. Two features of [Figure 6] are notable. First is the 
substantial difference in the composition of transfers to the elderly versus transfers 
to young. Per capita private transfers to the young are much more important than per 
capita public transfers. For the old, both private and public transfers are important. 
The second feature is the importance of assets for the very old people. As we shall 
see in the next, however, support systems vary considerably from country to country. 
 
 
 
 
 Support System over the Lifecycle: A Cross-Country Comparison 47 
[Figure 6] Per Capita Net Flows by Age in Korea in 2000  
 
Source: National Transfer Accounts Database. 
 
Labor Income 
Labor income in NTA is a broad measure consisting of earnings and benefits 
received by employees and the estimated value of the labor of the self-employed, 
including unpaid family workers. Individuals younger than 20 do not support 
themselves through their labor to any significant degree. However, it is more 
important source to meet the consumption needs of the young in poor countries. In 
more developed countries, the young tend to invest more in human capital and 
realize greater incomes in the future. The picture changes as they enter their 20s.  
In Japan, those in their early 20s contribute the least to their own support funding 
only half of their consumption, but in their late 20s they are funding all of their 
consumption through their labor. Individuals in their 20~24 fund mostly between 50 
percent 80 of their consumption through their labor income. Labor income is 
especially high relative to consumption among Chinese workers in their 20s, a 
feature driven in large part by the high savings rates and low levels of consumption 
at all ages in China. Austria is an exception perhaps due to well spread apprentice 
systems (Lee and Ogawa 2011). The low percentage in Nigeria is also surprising 
which might be in part related with the low productivity of young workers. 
Labor income drops below consumption around age 55. Labor income accounts  
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<Table 2> Ratio of Labor Income to per Capita Consumption of Children and Elderly 
Labor/Consumption 0~19 20~24 65+ 65~74 
Austria (2000) 11.79 119.9 2.0 3.4 
Brazil (1996) 5.5 46.8 14.7 23.6 
Chile (1997) 5.5 59.3 18.5 29.3 
China (2002) 10.7 95.6 23.0 26.7 
Costa Rica (2004) 6.2 62.0 21.1 33.9 
Finland (2004) 3.3 59.1 3.9 6.4 
Germany (2003) 3.2 59.3 2.4 4.1 
Hungary (2005) 0.5 46.7 5.4 9.8 
India (2004) 9.5 62.9 22.7 31.1 
Indonesia (2005) 9.0 65.3 41.1 46.9 
Japan (2004) 1.0 50.0 11.2 18.5 
Kenya (1994) 4.9 78.7 27.6 43.6 
Mexico (2004) 7.3 50.3 23.2 35.5 
Nigeria (2004) 1.3 19.1 44.8 62.4 
Philippines (1999) 6.9 59.0 30.8 46.8 
Slovenia (2004) 2.3 60.8 3.1 5.8 
S. Korea (2000) 4.8 72.7 17.7 29.6 
Spain (2000) 3.2 52.9 6.7 12.4 
Sweden (2003) 3.7 75.2 7.2 16.1 
Taiwan (1998) 3.0 64.7 8.7 14.6 
Thailand (2004) 6.9 65.5 13.4 21.7 
Uruguay (2006) 6.0 85.2 21.1 35.1 
US (2003) 2.5 60.7 25.1 37.4 
Note: These are synthetic cohort values that are calculated using recent data on survival weights of the United States. Values 
are the ratio of the sum of per capita labor income at each single year of age and the sum of per capita consumption at 
each single year of age within the age group. 
Source: National Transfer Accounts database accessed 1 May 2012. 
 
for mostly 10 to 30 percent of their consumption for the elderly ages 65 and older. 
Note that this is not due to their difference in survival rate since this is a synthetic 
cohort measure. That is the numbers presented in <Table 2> are free from the 
different survival rates across countries. In Korea, they are somewhat high, 
compared with other advanced countries. This is not surprising given the very high 
labor force participation rates of the elderly in Korea. As Lee and Ogawa (2011) 
argue the problem of Korea is that the productivity of the elderly is low in general, 
because they are employed in low-productivity sectors, or because they have less  
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[Figure 7] Private Transfers as a Proportion of the Lifecycle Deficit for Ages 0~19   
 
Note: These are synthetic cohort values calculated by summing per capita consumption for ages 0 to 19 and dividing by the 
sum of the per capita lifecycle deficit for ages 0 to 19.  
Source: Lee and Mason (2011). Originally calculated using the National Transfer Accounts Database. 
 
education than young workers, or because they are forced into low-productivity jobs 
by mandatory retirement provisions. 
 
Public vs. Private Transfers for Children 
In most countries, the gap between consumption and labor income for children is 
filled almost entirely by a combination of public and private transfers since children 
do not accumulate a lot of assets. [Figure 7] shows the varying importance of public 
transfers across countries. Although public transfers to children are high in European 
economies, the same is not true in Latin America. This is quite interesting since 
public transfers for the elderly are very high in Latin American countries as we will 
see in the next section. In a few high-income economies outside of Asia, net public 
transfers to children are larger than net private transfers, i.e., the state bears the cost 
of children to a greater extent than families do. Two examples are Hungary and 
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Austria.5 In most rich economies, however, private transfers to children fund more 
than half of their lifecycle deficit. In Japan, for example, private transfers cover 52 
percent of the cost of raising a child.6 In the six European economies in [Figure 7], 
private transfers as a percentage of the lifecycle deficit over the childhood years vary 
from a low of 40 percent in Hungary to a high of 64 percent in Spain. In Latin 
America and in Asia, Japan aside, families bear a higher share of the cost of children, 
and the public sector plays a less important role. In Taiwan, private transfers to 
children are just under 70 percent of the total resources they require. In India, the 
private share is the highest at 83 percent of the total, followed by the Philippines. 
Clearly there is a close relationship between development level and the 
importance of private transfers. The simple correlation between purchasing power 
parity adjusted per capita income and the private transfer share is -0.79. That is, an 
increase in per capita income of US$1,000 is associated roughly with a decline in the 
share of the deficit funded through private transfers by 0.8 percentage points. Korea 
and the US have high private transfers relative to the predicted level. The size of 
private transfers to children in Asia is potentially important for a number of reasons. 
In some Asian economies, private transfers seem to be substitutes for public 
transfers. The per capita consumption of children in India, Indonesia, and 
Philippines, is on the low side relative to consumption by adults aged 20~64 while in 
China, Korea, and Taiwan private consumption by children is higher relative to 
consumption by adults than in any other NTA economy. Moreover, total 
consumption by children in these economies tends to be relatively high compared 
with others (Tung 2011). An interesting possibility is that the high private transfer 
burden in Asia may serve to depress childbearing, which is intuitive. However, a 
simple correlation between the total fertility rate and the private transfer proportion 
is positive, i.e., high fertility is associated with families bearing a higher share of the 
cost of children. Thus, it appears that families bear more the burden of raising 
children in a country with high fertility.  
  
Economic Resources for the Old 
[Figure 8] shows the relative importance of the three sources of old-age 
support—assets, private transfers and public transfers—in Asian, Latin American,  
                                                                                                                                                      
5  Public transfers are broadly measured here and include children’s pro rata share of all public 
consumption in addition to education and healthcare spending that is more directly consumed by 
children.   
6  This is a synthetic cohort value calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of age-specific per capita 
net private transfers from ages 0 to 19 to the sum the lifecycle deficit, i.e., consumption less labor 
income, from ages 0 to 19.   
 [Figure 8] Support Systems for 
Note: See [Figure 2]. 
Source: National Transfer Accounts database accessed 1 July 2011.
 
and European economies and the US. All indicators are measured as net; transfers 
received less transfers made and asset income less savings relative to consumption 
in excess of labor income for those 65 and older. The lifecycle deficit, consumption 
less labor income, must equal net public transfers plus net private transfers plus 
asset-based reallocations; hence, the three components of the support systems must 
sum to 100 percent.  
There are interesting regional patterns in the support systems. Familial transfers 
for old age are much more significant in Asia than in the other economies.  
Familial transfers fund about 45 percent of the lifecycle deficit for the elderly in 
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Taiwan, one thirds in Thailand, and slightly below 20 percent in China and Korea. 
In Japan and the Philippines, however, the elderly provide as much support to their 
children and grandchildren as they receive. India and Indonesia are distinctive in that 
their net private transfers are negative for those 65 and older. Net familial transfers 
are quite small or negative in Europe, Latin America, and the US. In comparison 
with Europe and Latin America, the public sector is less important to the elderly in 
Asia, except as noted below. In the Philippines and Thailand, for example, net 
public transfers are zero, i.e., the elderly pay as much in taxes as they receive in 
benefits, while in Indonesia, the elderly pay somewhat more in taxes than they 
receive in benefits. None of these economies has large public pension programs or 
healthcare systems that target the elderly. In Korea and Taiwan, net public transfers 
are funding nearly one third of the lifecycle deficits of the elderly.7 Social programs 
for the elderly are also similar in their net effect to those found in Mexico or the US, 
but they are relatively small in comparison with programs in Europe and South 
America. Assets are an important source of support in all Asian economies except 
China and Taiwan. In Indonesia and the Philippines, the elderly rely entirely on 
assets. Certainly some elderly in those countries depend on familial and public 
transfers, but as a group net transfers to the elderly are zero or negative and asset-
based reallocations are equal to or exceed the lifecycle deficit. Thailand’s elderly 
also rely heavily on assets.  
How support systems are likely to change in the future is a very important 
question about which there is relatively limited information. Korea and Taiwan have 
both implemented more generous public pension programs. As these programs 
mature, net transfers to the elderly are likely to rise. In the absence of pension 
reform, these programs will be increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of the 
dramatic population aging anticipated in Korea and Taiwan. This issue will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
7  It should be noted, however, age profiles of Korean public pension transfers based on 2000 data 
show very small inflows of pension transfers to the elderly (ages 60+) simply because 2008 was the 
first year of normal benefit disbursement from the National Pension Scheme. Current public 
transfers may be different from those in 2000 because the system has changed substantially during 
the last few years. 
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Ⅳ. Public Support 
 
 
Fiscal Support Ratio 
Changes in age structure have a strong effect on public finances due to the age 
patterns of public transfer inflows and outflows apparent from the figures presented 
above. Miller (2011) calculated the fiscal support ratio to assess the pressures on 
fiscal sustainability arising from public transfers. He held age-specific public 
transfer inflows and outflows constant while allowing the population age structure to 
change in accordance with historical estimates and projections. <Table 3> shows the  
 
<Table 3> Fiscal Support Ratios: 1950~2050 
(unit: %) 
 1950 2000 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Austria 106 100 95 87 82 78 
Brazil 100 100 94 86 77 69 
Chile 95 100 95 86 81 77 
China 89 100 97 89 84 82 
Costa Rica 89 100 97 91 83 76 
Germany 111 100 94 84 79 75 
Hungary 106 100 97 93 83 77 
India 97 100 102 103 103 102 
Indonesia 79 100 106 110 109 108 
Japan 91 100 92 87 79 74 
Mexico 86 100 102 99 92 86 
Philippines 87 100 106 111 114 116 
S. Korea 76 100 97 89 83 80 
Spain 94 100 96 87 78 73 
Sweden 115 100 96 90 88 86 
Thailand 66 100 104 104 104 104 
Uruguay 108 100 100 98 95 90 
US 99 100 96 92 90 89 
Slovenia 100 100 90 81 75 72 
Taiwan 68 100 100 94 85 78 
Note: Recalculated based on Miller (2011).  
Source: NTA database accessed 1 May 2012 
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evolution of the fiscal support ratio for the NTA member countries using the age 
profiles of public transfers in the NTA data sets. The effective number of taxpayers 
is calculated by weighting the population in each year using the age profile of per 
capita taxes paid. The effective number of beneficiaries is calculated using per capita 
benefits in the base year to weight the population age distribution. The ratio is set to 
100 in the base year of 2010 so that all values are expressed relative to the fiscal 
position in 2010. As the population age distribution changes, the fiscal support ratio 
increases if the effective number of taxpayers rises relative to the effective number 
of beneficiaries and declines if the effective number of taxpayers declines relative to 
the effective number of public transfer beneficiaries. The change in the fiscal 
support ratio indicates the relative size of the tax hikes or benefit cuts needed to 
return to the initial fiscal position. 
It is not surprising that the fiscal impact of population aging is projected to be 
biggest in Japan. Population aging combined with the current tax and benefit 
policies would lead to a 26 percent decline in the fiscal support ratio by 2050 in 
Japan. Thus, either taxes must increase, benefits must decrease, deficits must 
increase, or some combination of the three must occur. Korea also shows somewhat 
smaller but big fiscal impacts with 22 reductions in the fiscal support ratio by 2050. 
The danger, of course, is that economies with favorable demographics or a lot of 
political pressure will implement generous transfer systems that ultimately prove to 
be unsustainable.  
 
Recent Trends in Public Support System of Korea  
The problem of using the snapshot for year 2000 Korean data has limited validity 
in portraying the current status of the Korean public support system simply because 
the system has been changing rapidly. It may therefore be helpful to describe the 
recent changes for some public-sector accounts.  
Lee and Mason (2012) project the healthcare expenditure for Asian countries. 
The assumptions underlying these calculations are such that the shapes of the age 
profiles of benefits are fixed over time with their levels but population change over 
time and consumption increases at the same rate as the gross domestic product 
(GDP). The values for 2008 were the actual expenditures as a percentage of GDP for 
each economy. [Figure 9] documents the projected and actual expenditures on 
healthcare in China, Japan and Korea from 1995 to 2008. The projections present the 
effects of demographic change; hence, the difference between actual and projected 
spending can be attributed to factors other than population change such as an 
increase in the level of benefits holding GDP constant. In other words, GDP growth 
alone should not affect the results because the level of benefits is assumed to be  
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[Figure 9] Projected and Actual Publicly Funded Health Expenditures for China, Japan,  
and Korea from 1995 to 2008 
 
Note: See the manuscript for methodology. 
Source: Lee and Mason (2012).  
 
constant regardless of changes in GDP or other macroeconomic factors. The results 
show that the actual and projected expenditures in Japan were very similar 
suggesting that the increase in publicly funded healthcare spending during the period 
can be almost entirely explained by the change in population structure.  In contrast, 
the projected and actual changes for Korea were quite different in that actual 
spending increased much more rapidly.  For example, about 90% of the change in 
publicly funded health expenditures between 1995 (5.7% of GDP) and 2008 (6.7%) 
in Japan is explained by change in population structure while the increase in Korea 
for the same period (from 1.4% to 3.5%) is almost unrelated to changes in 
population age structure.  
The rapid growth in government expenditures for the elderly in Korea is 
surprising. According to An et al. (2011), the medical insurance benefits rose 15.3% 
per annum between 2000 and 2005 and public pension benefits grew by 9% 
annually during the same period. This sharp rise during a short time span is 
somewhat exceptional. One might argue this change in Korea could be due to year-
specific macroeconomic swings that might have affected specific government 
expenditures; however, given that health and pension transfers are much less 
affected by short-run macroeconomic swings, the effect is likely due to a more 
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fundamental change in the scope of public sector programs. Also I do not see the 
political regime is particularly related with this change. Again, this is confirmed by 
other sources of information by age for Korea. Specifically, there was a sharp 
increase in benefits for those over age 55 owing to increases in public pension and 
medical insurance benefits. The sharp rise in public pension benefits for those aged 
60~64 reflects a rise in the number of newly entitled national pension benefit 
recipients. Higher benefits for those aged 65 and older were mainly due to an 
increase in benefits paid out by occupational pensions. Recent changes in medical 
insurance policies also substantially raised the medical insurance benefits for the 
older age groups. Changes in Korea mirror a growing concern in many countries that 
transfer programs will grow extremely rapidly due to increases in the number of 
elderly and due to changing patterns of public consumption that are mainly due to 
the rapid increase in per capita public transfers to the elderly. 
Some other countries increase public transfers to their elderly populations as they 
get richer. For example, in 2009, the Chinese government committed itself to 
building a universal public pension system in rural areas funded by individual 
premiums and government subsidies. Also in China, public health insurance was 
available to urban employees in 1998, to rural citizens in 2003, and to urban citizens 
in 2007 (Li, Chen, and Jiang 2011). This seems to work so far, given the high 
growth of China, but as we can see from recent slowdown of the Chinese economy, 
it is quite uncertain if this rapid expansion of public transfers will be feasible in the 
future China.  
 
 
Ⅴ. Implication for Korea’s Sustained Growth  
 
 
The elderly in Korea are relying less on their families than they did in the past. 
The question is, what strategy should be used to compensate for the decline in this 
traditional source of old-age support: developing extensive social welfare systems as 
in Europe and parts of Latin America or relying more on accumulating personal 
assets as in the Philippines, Thailand, and the US? The strategy must simultaneously 
meet both challenges of providing economic security for the elderly and sustaining 
economic growth. 
One strategy emphasizes capital accumulation. Many of the fundamental insights 
were established by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Tobin (1967) who 
explored the implications of the economic lifecycle for savings and investment. The 
lifecycle has implications for both because the old-age deficit is funded in part by 
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asset-based reallocations. Population aging will lead to an increase in the demand for 
assets for three reasons. First, to the extent that longer life expectancy leads to 
longer retirements, the incentive to accumulate more during the working years will 
increase. Second, because fertility is lower, fewer resources may be devoted to 
childrearing and more to saving for retirement. The third reason is simply due to age 
composition. Older individuals are wealthier than before because they have had 
longer to accumulate wealth; hence, a population composed of more old people will 
have greater wealth per capita. The strength of the relationship between age structure 
and savings depends, however, on the nature of the old-age income support system. 
This idea has been explored in many industrialized countries and to a more limited 
extent in developing countries. The primary focus has been the possibility that 
public transfers will crowd out savings (Feldstein 1974, 1998; Gale 1998; and 
Munnell 1974). These and similar studies inform efforts to evaluate existing transfer 
systems, to guide the development of new systems, and to anticipate the implications 
of alternative reform proposals. Social security reform, in particular, has been the 
subject of an enormous amount of research (Feldstein and Samwick 2001, Feldstein 
1998, and Krueger and Kubler 2002). Previous studies and the following analysis 
show that through this mechanism, changes in age structure can lead to the second 
demographic dividend (Mason and Lee 2007), i.e., to higher standards of living that 
persist long after the favorable effects of the first dividend have ended. Of course, 
the big question of whether increase in savings necessarily leads to productive 
investment remains.  
Healthcare for the elderly is a large and increasing cost that is often heavily 
subsidized by the public sector. Korea has had some advantage so far since the cost 
has been kept low. However, this may not be sustainable as the cost of healthcare 
will rise due to aging. People may live longer, but there is little evidence that they 
live healthier for the extended life. The huge long term care cost observed in many 
developed countries might be inevitable. Thus, aging in Korea will eventually lead 
to large implicit debts that are shared by taxpayers and the adult children of the 
elderly.  
A recent analysis by Lee and Mason (2010) showed that the impact of spending 
on human capital, such as education, is strong enough to offset the adverse effects of 
population aging, but this conclusion depends on the effectiveness of the investment. 
The investment response to population aging naturally integrates sustaining 
economic growth and providing economic security to the elderly. This is because the 
high rate of investment is a consequence of workers saving more for their retirement. 
The situation is very different with human capital. Retirees do not own the human 
capital in which they have invested; instead it is owned by the children who received 
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it. The only way to recoup the investment is through expanded public transfers. 
Given current trends in private transfers, it seems unlikely that parents who invest 
more in their children will be compensated by old-age support directly from their 
children. The compensation is more likely to take the form of public transfers 
intermediated by the government. Smaller cohorts of workers would thus pay higher 
taxes to support the elderly as compensation for the higher levels of human capital 
investment they received. The question is whether the huge education investment is 
effective in Korea, leading to an increase in productivity of the economy, which in 
turn can cancel out the negative effect of population aging. 
The two paths, investing in physical capital and human capital, are not actually 
mutually exclusive. Ideally, an approach to sustaining economic growth and 
providing economic security would strike the right balance between assets and 
public transfers while promoting high rates of human capital investment. Finally, 
although this discussion has centered on economic growth and average standards of 
living, poverty and inequality are also inextricably linked each other. Although 
studies are limited, enriched microeconomic data will shed light on this issue. 
 
 
Ⅵ. Conclusion 
 
 
Korea is facing fundamental challenges in social policy. The first hurdle is the 
challenge of population aging. The second hurdle is the imbalance in the labor 
market. The third hurdle is that the traditional familial support for the old has been 
rapidly deteriorating. Impacts of changing support systems on other means of 
support will be significant. If labor income and familial transfers play a limited role 
in the future, Koreans have to rely on accumulating assets or public transfers. Thus, 
without any doubt there will a growing demand for more public protection either 
due to economic downturn, population aging, or due to political pressure. It is 
important to design the public support over the lifecycle effectively and efficiently. 
How well Korea tackles these challenges will determine whether the country will be 
able to continue to grow. 
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